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I. INTRODUCTION
"Equal justice under law" is the cornerstone of the United States'
judicial system, a societal ideal that has influenced American legal
philosophy, and a phrase engraved on the front of the United States Supreme
Court in Washington D.C.' Although the language stirs patriotic sentiment
and is historically revered,2 it is well documented that the legal needs of
impoverished individuals in this country remain largely unmet.3 Studies
have repetitively shown that over eighty percent of the legal needs of the
poor go unaddressed each year.4 Legal Services experts refer to this
phenomenon as "the Justice Gap."
In the United States, resolving disputes typically requires hiring a
licensed lawyer due to the complications of investigating, examining,
presenting, and appealing a case, as well as the restrictions that prevent non-
lawyers from practicing law. Functional theorists support these restrictions
because of lawyers' unique expertise and training in a society that is
7untutored in legal dilemmas. Lawyers, however, cost money.8 When an
individual cannot afford one, the court may appoint one but only if the
case is criminal in nature.9 The converse is true for an individual's civil
case.'0 Rather than appointing representation to defend civil claims, the
courts present the litigant with a legal ultimatum: find the means to hire an
attorney or proceed by representing yourself
Apart from a small category of disputes, the United States acknowledges
no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases which in effect excludes
from the American adversarial process a majority of the population who
1. The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUPREME COURT WEBSITE,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
2. Id.
3. LEGAL SERV. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 2, 17 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/
sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documentingthejusticegapin america_2009.pdf [hereinafter
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA].
4. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice
System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 327 (2010).
5. DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 1.
6. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 327.
7. RICHARD L. ABEL, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (1988).
8. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation,
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT: CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 5 (2013),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/esph online2.ashx.
9. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
10. Nichol, supra note 4, at 356-57.
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
cannot afford to participate." Consequently, financially resourced
individuals are more likely to access the justice system than those with low-
incomes.12 Due to the substantive and procedural complexities of the
American legal system, a litigant represented by an attorney is also
statistically more likely to win his case than if he represented himself,
thereby creating the motivation for those who can afford an attorney to
retain one.13 In our system, even attorneys prefer to be represented by other
attorneys.14 Thus, the legal ultimatum reveals its absence of true choice: in
disputes where civil representation is denied and contingency fee
arrangements, pro bono services, and legal aid are unavailable, proceeding
pro se is a litigant's only option. This lack of counsel has a detrimental effect
on the outcome of the proceedings and the livelihoods of those individuals.
In South Carolina, despite a variety of efforts to provide access to
justice-including volunteer lawyer programs, pro bono projects, an
extensive network of free legal clinics, pre-paid legal services, and
assistance from a federally-funded Legal Services Corporation the State is
still unable to reach a large percentage of those citizens who are in need of
counsel in civil court proceedings. Due to the absence of a constitutional
right to civil representation, augmented by the legal profession's monopolies
over legal services, a substantial justice gap has formed between the legal
needs of low-income people and the capacity of the South Carolina justice
system to meet those needs.'7 These deficiencies in both court access and
case outcomes are observed and experienced primarily by the economically
marginalized individuals who are denied the effective use of South
Carolina's adjudicatory systems.
Part I of this Note introduces the civil justice system and the common
disputes that are left in disrepair by the expansive justice gap in civil legal
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship-A Legal
Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 46 (2011).
14. See Jay D. Hall, Representing Yourself Pro Se: Crafty Legal Strategy or Fool's
Errand?, LEGALITY (Mar. 8, 2008), http://www.thelegality.com/2008/03/05/representing-
yourself-pro-se-crafty-legal-strategy-or-fool's-errand/ ("[A] lawyer who represents himself has
a fool for a client.").
15. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 51, 69 (2010).
16. See Resolution of the Board of Directors of South Carolina Legal Services, LEGAL
SERVS. CORP. (Dec. 2007), http://lri.archive.1sc.gov/sites/default/files/LRI/South_
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services.19 It identifies what the justice gap is before carefully revealing the
legal profession's systemic and procedural monopolies that bar access to
*20
justice.
Part II analyzes the limited right to civil representation in South
21Carolina. It describes the national history of civil representation, current
South Carolina statutory appointment provisions, and federal and state case
law that has interpreted the issue over the years.22 Part II also highlights the
current South Carolina services available to assist the poor in finding civil
23representation.
Part III addresses the "pro se ultimatum" and the paradox that exists in
regards to our adversary system.24 While South Carolina does have resources
available to assist pro se litigants through the judicial system,25 research has
shown that pro se litigants face a higher likelihood of negative outcomes.26
Finally, Part IV of this Note identifies solutions to increase access to
justice in order to help close the justice gap in civil legal services.27 For
South Carolina, this will mean unclenching the fists of the systemic and
procedural monopolies that control the legal profession, recognizing a
complete statutory or common law right to civil appointment, and increasing
pro se resources and civil legal aid.
II. INACCESSIBILITY TO CIVIL JUSTICE
A. What Do Civil Cases Look Like?
For the majority of the American public, civil justice disputes emerge
"at the intersection of civil law and everyday adversity."28 These problems
involve family, personal injury, employment, financial, insurance, pension,
housing, and property matters, in addition to endless other struggles of
contemporary life. 29
19. See infra Part I.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 52 (citing Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of
Doing Nothing: Everyday problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES:
LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 1, 113 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007)).
29. Id.
864 [VOL. 6 8: 861
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Studies have shown that experiencing civil justice dilemmas can lead to
physical and mental health problems, the breakdown of family relationships,
loss of housing, lost employment, and lost income-in addition to other
adverse consequences.30 Civil disputes are circular in nature because initial
incidents can diverge into a plethora of additional problems which include
both civil and criminal disputes.3 ' For example, consider the viscous cycle of
a poor tenant whose landlord decides to illegally increase the rent. Unable
to pay, the landlord wrongfully evicts the tenant who is forced into
homelessness. The individual is subsequently arrested for loitering in a
public place when they try to sleep in the park. Also consider the father who
is delinquent on child support payments. Unable to pay, a court places him
in jail until he does. In the interim, he loses his employment and the only
means to pay his way out of the initial civil claim. In both of these
circumstances, the initial civil claim spiraled into a criminal charge that will
have severe consequences for the future and life of the individual.
The effects of civil cases are felt not only by the parties involved, but
32also by society as a whole. Research reveals that adverse health
consequences of civil justice problems can lead to increased public
expenditures on the provision of medical services.3 Similarly, cases
involving lost employment or housing can lead to an increased use of
publicly subsidized benefits.34 In addition to fiscal negatives, these outcomes
may result in the lack of public legitimacy and trust in the legal system as a
whole.35
Though there is a wide array of civil issues, all differing in nature, they
share certain commonalities: they are problems that raise civil legal issues
and have consequences haped by civil law.36 Furthermore, because they are
30. Id. at 55 (citing Pascoe Pleasence et al., Mounting Problems: Further Evidence on
the Social, Economic and Health Consequences of Civil Justice Problems, in TRANSFORMING
LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 1, at 72-76 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds, 2007).
31. See id. (citing HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE Do AND THINK
ABOUT GOING TO LAW 35 (1999)).
32. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 55.
33. Id. (citing Pleasence et al., supra note 28, at 83-84).
34. Id. (citing Pleasence et al., supra note 28, at 85). See also Pascoe Pleasence et al.,
Causes of Action: First Findings of the LSRC Periodic Survey, 30(1) J. L. & SOC'Y 11, 19
(2003) (finding a great proportion of people living in temporary accommodation "were living
in [them] as a consequence of justiciable problems they had experienced").
35. Id. (citing Ab Currie, 'A Lightening Rod for Discontent': Justiciable Problems and
Attitudes Toward Law and the Justice System, in REACHING FURTHER: INNOVATION, ACCESS
AND QUALITY IN LEGAL SERVICES 100, 111-12 (2009)).
36. Id. at 53 (citing GENN, supra note 31, at 12-13).
2017] 865
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civil, as opposed to criminal, in nature, they afford an individual no right to
civil representation.7
B. The Justice Gap: Identifying Access to Justice Deficiencies
"Ninety percent of our lawyers serve ten percent of our people. We are
overlawyered and underrepresented."38
Without a constitutional right to civil representation, parties are forced
to pay for private representation or represent themselves.39 If a party cannot
afford private representation, they may independently search for state or
federal assistance. Some initiatives provide free legal aid or references to pro
bono attorneys. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) is the single largest
funder of civil legal assistance to low-income individuals and operates as a
federally funded nonprofit organization with over 800 offices nation-wide.40
Although millions are helped each year through the LSC, the demand for
legal aid far outweighs the resources available.4'
National and state studies conducted since 2000 consistently reveal that
over 80 percent of low-income individuals are not afforded the assistance
42required to effectively navigate complex legal proceedings. With daunting
43statistics, the issue has hardly gone unnoticed. In 2009, the LSC issued a
report that used a variety of methodologies to identify the civil legal needs of
low-income individuals in order to quantify the amount of civil legal
assistance needed to respond appropriately.44 The results mirrored the
conclusions of a large body of social scientific literature that has been
growing for two decades:45
Of those people who seek assistance from LSC-funded legal aid
programs, one is turned away because of limited resources for every
37. Nichol, supra note 4, at 357.
38. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Cal. Remarks at the 100th Anniversary
Luncheon of the L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass'n (May 4, 1978),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30750.
39. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 357.
40. nho We Are, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about-sc/who-we-are (last
visited Dec. 1, 2015).
41. Id.
42. STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, DIRECTORY
OF LAw GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS, ABA 1
(2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid indigent defen
dants/1s_sclaidjudges manual_prefatory_info.authcheckdam.pdf.
43. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 16, at 1-2.
44. Id
45. Id at 2.
866 [VOL. 6 8: 861
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
one helped. Only a small fraction of the legal needs of low-income
people are addressed with the assistance of an attorney. There are
more than ten times as many private lawyers providing personal
legal services to persons in the general population above the LSC
poverty threshold as there are legal aid attorneys in relation to the
low-income population they serve. State courts are being
overwhelmed by a rising tide of unrepresented litigants, many of
them low-income people eligible for LSC-funded assistance who
46have been unable to obtain an attorney.
Furthermore, the statistics from the 2009 LSC report state that
nationally, there is one private attorney providing personal legal services for
every 429 people in the general population, and one legal aid attorney
(including those funded by all sources) available to serve 6,415
impoverished individuals.4 7
All of these findings support the conclusion that a substantial justice gap
exists in the United States between the level of legal assistance available and
the level that is necessary to meet the civil legal needs of low-income
Americans.4 8
C. Monopolization: History and Function
The legal profession's monopoly over legal services has substantially
decreased access to justice through quandaries created by lawyer licensing,
expensive legal costs, and procedural complexity.
Having historically been a "backward-looking, change-resistant
institution," the American legal profession has consistently "failed to adjust
to changes in society, technology, and economics."49 "[D]espite individual
lawyers' efforts to change their own practices and entrepreneurs' efforts to
enter the legal marketplace to serve the needs of middle and lower-income
clients[,]" the profession has maintained a privileged status through the use
of monopolies since the American Revolution.50
Market theory may help demonstrate the rationale behind this
phenomenon. When a necessary product becomes rare in supply, its demand
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Id. at 1.
48. DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 1.
49. James E. Molitemo, The Trouble with Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L. J. 885,
885-86 (2013).
50. Id. at 885.
2017] 867
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and value increases.5 ' Therefore, one way to increase the demand and value
of lawyers is to prove they are necessary and that non-lawyers are incapable
of providing similar services. The legal profession posits a functional
justification for its monopoly: due to the inherent importance to society, the
complexity of its nature, and the competence and education needed to fulfill
its purpose, lawyers are entitled to power and prestige-i.e. high income and
the right to self-regulate.52 On the other hand, those critical of this functional
theory argue that it is not the unique knowledge and skill that justifies
prestige and power.53 Rather, they suggest a monopoly was created when
those who already held power convinced the rest of society of their
functional uniqueness and necessitated power to reinforce their political
strength.54
However skeptical this source of professional power is, it is not unheard
of. For example, many contemporary elite professions (medicine and law,
for example) originally gained their high status by using mystification and
secrecy regarding their real skills and utilizing their status background rather
than individualized technique. For lawyers, "1870 to 1920 was the seminal
period in the legal profession's campaign to prevent the practice of law by
,,56non-lawyers. Elite lawyers formed bar associations and embarked on
efforts to maintain market monopoly, social status, and autonomy.
Historically, the legal profession's monopolization has been justified
through the goal of protecting the public from incompetent practitioners.
This consumer protection stance places restraints and regulation upon
society for its own security, but ignores societal advances and valuable legal
* * 59service alternatives.
51. RICHARD L. ABEL, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (1988).
5 2. Id.
53. Id. at 7-8.
54. Id.
55. RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 135 (1979).
56. Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of
Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2611, 2612 (2014) (citing Barlow F. Christensen, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even
Good Sense?, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 166-69, 186).
57. Id (citing RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 20, 25 (1989); TERENCE C.
HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL
EMPOWERMENT 67-68 (1987); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 49-50 (1977); Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 287, 294-97 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002)).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 2612-13.
868 [VOL. 6 8: 861
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss5/2
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
D. A Systemic and Procedural Monopoly
One attribute of the monopoly that leads to inaccessibility of the court
system is the design of a legal structure that, in most states, is not open to
60non-lawyers. In practice, the successful monopoly over the U.S. legal
system is regulated by the enforcement of unauthorized practice of law
(UPL) laws that function to impute criminal liability upon those who seek to
61practice law without the necessary credentials. State courts and bar
62
associations are delegated the authority to define the practice boundaries.
Therefore, law is the only profession in the United States that has a
monopoly over both the legal profession and the judicial function that
63decides what constitutes UPL and determines the consequences. I term this
phenomenon of "lawyers regulating lawyers" the "systemic monopoly."
While a model requiring increased education and standards seems
admirable, UPL laws allow attorneys to set their own fee rates while
64prohibiting the possibility of reasonable alternatives. Going back to the
supply and demand market example, suppliers will increase fees in order to
restrict their commodity and cause an increase in demand and value.6 Due
to UPL restrictions, a litigant is unable to hire counsel that is not a licensed
attorney.6 Instead, they must submit to paying the fees set by the lawyers
67that they are required to hire.
To obtain reliable estimates of litigation costs, the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) developed the Civil Litigation Cost Model (CLCM),
which analyzes the cost of civil litigation by measuring the amount of time
68expended by attorneys in various stages of litigation. Cases that resolve
shortly after case initiation accumulate $1,000 to $7,350 per side in attorney
fees.69 As the case progresses, so do the costs. A case that settles after
discovery through formal settlement negotiations or ADR will range from
$5,000 to $36,000 in attorney fees.70 If the case goes to trial, the total costs,
60. Id. at 2613.
61. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlavyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An




65. See id. at 2599.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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including expert witness fees, can range from $18,000 to $109,000 per
side.7 Based on these estimates, it is easy to see how litigation costs affect a
* * 72
litigant's access to the civil justice system.
In addition to the systemic features, a "procedural monopoly" also exists
surrounding legal services. Due to the vastly complicated, obscure, and
formal structure of the civil dispute system, almost no one unschooled in the
law's specialized practices (almost uniformly identified by spending 3 years
at costly accredited institutions) can wisely navigate its intricacies.73
III. ADDRESSING THE RIGHT TO CIVIL REPRESENTATION: CONFRONTING
CHOICE ONE
Due to the lack of a constitutional right to civil representation, indigent
civil litigants are given two options: acquire private representation or
proceed by representing themselves. Proceeding under "choice one" is
hindered by the systemic monopoly over legal services.
A. History of the Right to Civil Representation
Most Americans falsely believe that indigent people have a guaranteed
right to counsel, regardless of whether an action is civil or criminal.74
However, ignoring precedents grounded in English common law,5 the
76
Magna Carta, and contemporarily granted in many Western democratic




74. Mary Deutsch Schneider, Trumpeting Civil Gideon an Idea Whose Time Has Come,
BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2006). See also Bar Survey Reveals Widespread Legal Illiteracy,
11 CAL. L. 68, 69 (1991) ("79 percent of citizens in a national survey responded 'yes"' when
asked whether a poor respondent would have a right to free counsel if sued in a civil court. In
both polls, this was the question about constitutional guarantees that was most often answered
incorrectly.").
75. See Schneider, supra note 74, at 23.
76. See id
77. See id ("Countries such as England, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, New Zealand, the
Australian states, and Canada provide poor people civil counsel in litigation, either through
statute, by constitution, or both.") (citing Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United
States' Failure to Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317,
331-32 (2001)).
870 [VOL. 6 8: 861
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78established in American law. Instead, State courts have exercised their
79discretion to appoint counsel in only a narrow category of cases.
The United States Supreme Court's historic 1963 decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright guarantees all defendants a constitutional right to counsel
(regardless of their inability to pay) if the case is criminal in nature and they
run the risk of being sentenced to prison.s Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, wrote, "reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."8' This decision
represents the "Gideon" philosophy that when the risks creep high enough, a
82litigant should not be expected to gamble with his liberty. He is therefore
deserving of a constitutional right to counsel.83
Eighteen years later, however, the need for counsel was not as obvious
in the civil context. In Lassiter v. North Carolina, the Court set out a
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only
84when he is threatened with the deprivation of his physical liberty. Three
elements are considered in determining what due process requires: the
private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the
procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions. In evaluating the weight
of these factors against the presumption, the Lassiter Court concluded that
the Due Process Clause did not require the appointment of counsel when a
State seeks to terminate an indigent's parental status.
After Lassiter, despite how grave the private interest at stake, how
minute the governmental interest, or how significant the risk of erroneous
deprivation is likely to be, the presumption against appointed counsel for an
indigent who is not likely to lose his personal liberty will necessarily carry
the day. Critics of Lassiter oppose this "presumption" in cases where
indigent litigants have something other than but just as vital as-their
physical liberty at stake, such as their livelihood, home, children, etc. For
78. See id.
79. Id.




84. Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
85. Id. at 33.
86. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 18 (1981).
87. Deborah Perluss, Washington's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 2
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example, while the threat of incarceration leaves a defendant with the risk of
a blemished record and the loss of future employment, a civil bankruptcy or
foreclosure judgment can have disturbing effects that last a lifetime.89 These
scholars also argue that weighing the presumption against the prescribed
balance is a difficult process that "compar[es] apples [with] oranges and
balance[es] individualized circumstance against broader social cost and
concern."90 However, because States may consider that federal constitutional
rules represent a floor rather than a ceiling, advocates for a civil right to
counsel have focused their efforts at the state level,9' arguing for broad
92statutory amendments that expand mandatory appointment in civil cases.
Due to Lassiter and the lack of a "Gideon" right to civil representation,
states have established the right to counsel in civil proceedings through
statutory or judicial holdings on the basis of a due process or equal
protection analysis.93 For example, reacting against Lassiter, a majority of
states have required the appointment of counsel for indigents in parental
termination proceedings, even though Lassiter did not require it.94
Furthermore, in 2006, the American Bar Association passed a historic
unanimous resolution outlining its strong support for the civil right to
counsel when basic needs are at stake such as shelter, sustenance, safety,
health, and child custody.95 Since 2006, several states organized initiatives to
address the issue and enacted legislation addressing these areas where basic
human needs are threatened.96
B. South Carolina Statutory and Case Law Appointment of Counsel
While the South Carolina courts have not recognized a constitutional
right to counsel in civil proceedings, the South Carolina legislature
89. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (holding that "any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him").
90. Nichol, supra note 4, at 341.
91. The state of Washington compels a different, more flexible approach than the
Lassiter holding. That approach rests on the fundamental right of access to justice, which
exists in the Washington Constitution.
92. See Schneider, supra note 74.
93. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 343; see also STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID
AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that state legislatures have enacted a
significant number of laws either mandating or authorizing appointment of counsel in civil
cases).
94. Nichol, supra note 4, at 342.
95. STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
42, at 2.
96. See id.
872 [VOL. 6 8: 861
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* * 97recognizes a statutory right to counsel in certain limited cases. For
instance, legislation has been passed appointing counsel in cases where an
obvious deprivation of liberty was occurring and in parental termination and
abuse cases.98 Important categories, however, remain unaddressed by statute.
South Carolina case law addresses divorce proceedings and reveals a
loophole exists concerning civil contempt for nonpayment of child support.99
Case law precedent has also been established that allows the court to appoint
a pro bono attorney despite the existence of a constitutional or statutory
right.'00
Similar to the holding in Gideon, the South Carolina Defense of
Indigents Act provides counsel by statute in the criminal context for any
person arrested for a crime in South Carolina, for a juvenile who faces the
threat of imprisonment, and for any person charged with violating
probation.101 Furthermore, an indigent person is entitled by statute to an
attorney during proceedings involving involuntary hospitalization for mental
illness,102 quarantine or isolation due to public health emergency,103 and
post-conviction relief.104
South Carolina has also taken steps to counter the holding prescribed in
Lassiter by statutorily expanding the right to counsel to cases involving
child welfare.1os According to S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2560(A), "[p]arents,
guardians, or other persons subject to a termination of parental rights action
are entitled to legal counsel. Those persons unable to afford legal
representation must be appointed counsel by the family court, unless the
defendant is in default."'0 6 Similarly, appointment is provided for parents
and guardians subject to abuse and neglect proceedings. o7 For the children
in these cases, appointment of a guardian ad litem is mandatory but
appointment of counsel is discretionary.0 8
97. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530 (mandating appointment of counsel in
judicial commitment proceedings).
98. S.C. App. Ct. R. 602; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-540(F)
(2002).
99. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
100. See Exparte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983).
101. S.C. App. Ct. R. 602.
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-540(F) (2002).
104. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d).
105. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560(A).
106. Id.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1620(3).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1620(1)-(2).
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In commitment proceedings for sexually violent predators, S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-48-80(C) (1) refers to the right "to be represented by counsel," but
does not clarify whether this is a right to be represented by appointed
counsel.109 No statute in South Carolina could be located regarding the
appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in domestic violence protection
order proceedings''0 or paternity proceedings."
Turning to case law, unlike South Carolina's position of protecting the
right to counsel for parental termination actions by statute, divorce
proceedings have been addressed only by common law and have not merited
equivalent support.112 A husband in Washington v. Washington represented
himself pro se in a property distribution hearing following a divorce and
argued that he had been denied due process because the court failed to
provide him with counsel. 113 The South Carolina Supreme Court decided
that a due process right to counsel involves a deprivation of a liberty interest,
and while certain domestic proceedings may generate this right, a separation
proceeding simply does not involve a deprivation that mandates a due
process right to an attorney.114
In spite of this, the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Price v. Turner
decided that counsel to indigent fathers would be denied solely because
states may seek to enforce delinquent child support orders through civil
contempt rather than criminal charges."' The analysis explained that
because civil contempt differs from criminal contempt, the former does not
require all of the "constitutional safeguards" applicable in criminal
proceedings."6 Price v. Turner was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court where it was vacated on grounds unrelated to the lack of counsel
claim. " The Supreme Court instead refused to find that indigent obligors
categorically have a constitutional right to counsel in civil contempt
proceedings in child support cases, even when there is a possibility of
109. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-80(C)(1).
110. See South Carolina, Directory of Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in State
Civil Proceedings, ABA 3 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legalaid indigent defendants/Is sclaidjudges manual_sc.authcheck
dam.pdf.
111. See id. at 11.
112. See Washington v. Washington, 308 S.C. 549, 551, 419 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1992).
113. Id at 550, 419 S.E.2d at 780.
114. Id at 551, 419 S.E.2d at 780.
115. Price v. Turner, 387 S.C. 142, 146, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (2011).
116. Id at 145, 691 S.E.2d at 472.
117. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
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incarceration." The analysis of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Price v. Turner is inconsistent with its previous holding in Washington,
where the court stated that appointing counsel was not justified because the
divorce case did not involve a deprivation of liberty such as incarceration."9
Price v. Turner clearly involved the risk of incarceration for nonpayment of
child support and the appointment of counsel was still denied.120
Next, the court in Ex parte Dibble (a case whose holding has been
adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court)121 established that in a civil
case where there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel, South
Carolina courts have the authority to appoint counsel because of the court's
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to ensure that just
results are reached to the fullest extent possible.122 This includes appointing
an attorney without compensation or allocating compensation from public
funds.123 Without a statutory requirement, however, this appointment
authority is wholly discretionary and based on a consideration of certain
equitable factors.124
In order to balance the inequities, a court must first weigh certain factors
to conclude the case is sufficiently extraordinary such that appointment is
necessary to render justice.125 This includes a determination of whether the
litigant is able to secure a lawyer on his own, whether there is a public
agency responsible for representing indigents, whether there are lawyers
willing to offer pro bono services, or whether the appointed lawyers are
already on a public payroll.126 Again, the Dibble court concluded that this
analysis only describes the court's inherent authority and avoids
consideration of whether an individual has a statutory or constitutional right
to a free lawyer, because "[i]ndeed, it appears without question that he has
none."127
118. Id.
119. See Washington, 308 S.C. at 551, 419 S.E.2d at 780.
120. Price, 387 S.C. at 146, 691 S.E.2d at 472.
121. Exparte Foster, 350 S.C. 238, 241, 565 S.E.2d 290, 292 (2002) ("At the time this
appointment was made, the factors to be considered in making such an appointment were
outlined in Ex parte Dibble.. . . Appellant rightly complains that the orders here are devoid of
any discussion of the Dibble factors. We therefore reverse and remand the appointment order
for reconsideration.").
122. Exparte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing
State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 174 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1943)).
123. Id. at 595-96, 310 S.E.2d at 442-43.
124. See id. at 596-97, 310 S.E.2d at 443.
125. Id. at 597, 310 S.E.2d at 443.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 595, 310 S.E.2d at 442.
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In South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. Tharp,128 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that uncompensated appointment of counsel to
represent indigents in civil cases is constitutional while recognizing that
courts in other jurisdictions are split and have conversely held this
unconstitutional because of the burden it places on attorneys.129 The Dibble
Court's opinion, however, argues for a stronger role of attorneys in serving
the community's broader needs. 130
In allowing the court to appoint pro bono counsel to indigent parties,
South Carolina has already taken the first fundamental step in recognizing
the importance of civil representation.'3 ' By acknowledging its authority to
do so without compensation, the state has also freed itself from the
inadequate justification of rejecting necessary civil counsel because public
funds are inadequate or unavailable.3 2 To follow the precedent that has
slowly been established in favor of a civil right to counsel, statutory
appointment should be expanded to encompass all cases that lie akin to
liberty implicating risks such as incarceration.
C. Supplementing Appointment: Available Services
In addition to limited statutory appointment and case law precedent of
civil representation, multiple programs and services aimed at providing civil
representation to low-income individuals have been utilized by the state. The
South Carolina Access to Justice Commission (SCATJ) was created in 2007
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in order to address the state's
acknowledged barriers to legal representation.133 South Carolina Legal
Services (SCLS) is a non-profit corporation that provides free legal services
for non-criminal legal matters and is funded through grants by the federally
funded Legal Services Corporation, the South Carolina Bar Foundation, state
court filing fees, and other federal, state, and local funding.13 4
South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center is another program that
offers necessary assistance to those in search of legal assistance or pro bono
128. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Tharp, 312 S.C. 243, 439 S.E.2d 854 (1994).
129. Id at 246-47, 439 S.E.2d at 857.
130. See Dibble, 279 S.C. at 596, 310 S.E.2d at 442.
131. See id. at 595, 310 S.E.2d at 442 ("The function of lawyers in the administration of
justice is manifestly more than merely to act as advocates for parties to disputes.").
132. See id. at 596, 310 S.E.2d at 443.
133. S.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, http://www.scatj.org/welcome.asp (last visited Dec. 11,
2015).
134. S.C. LEGAL SERVS., http://www.sclegal.org (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
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representation.135 The initiative's goal is to "influence policymakers to
ensure the law is fair, to educate the public and their advocates about the
law, and to assist attorneys in bringing systemic litigation where the law is
unfair."136 Realizing that over 18% of South Carolina residents live in
poverty, South Carolina Appleseed often partners with private law practices
and provides direct representation to low income individuals in civil
137cases.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PRO SE ULTIMATUM: CONFRONTING CHOICE Two
A. The Legal Quandary ofPro Se Litigants & the Adversarial Paradox
Due to the lack of a constitutionally recognized right to civil
representation, as evidenced by the expanding justice gap, economically
marginalized citizens are denied the effective use of America's state and
federal adjudicatory systems.138 In situations where civil representation is
denied and contingency fee arrangements, pro bono services, and legal aid is
unavailable, a litigant's only option is to represent himself. This means that
crucial disputes-many involving an individual's vital necessities such as
divorce, domestic violence, health care, shelter, subsistence, and life-
sustaining benefits-are either rejected or determined under extremely
unfair terms as a result of the absence of counsel.139
While there are measures that can be taken to facilitate access to the
courts for pro se litigants, representation by a competent attorney is still the
best alternative.140 However, the lack of access to an attorney forces many
desperate litigants to approach the legal system pro se.141 These litigants, as
well as those represented by counsel, are entitled to meaningful access to the
courts.142 Sufficient access to the courts, a right protected by the Due
135. See About Us, S.C. APPLESEED, http://scjustice.org/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 11,
2015).
136. Id.
137. Litigation, S.C. APPLESEED, http://scjustice.org/our-work/policy-areas/litigation/
(last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
138. Nichol, supra note 4, at 3 27-28.
139. Id. at 328.
140. See Hall, supra note 14 ("[A] lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a
client.").
141. See Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle For Access to Justice
Meeting the Challenge ofBench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 36, 36 (2002).
142. The right of access to courts has been traced in U.S. Supreme Court case law to the
privileges and immunities clause, the First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause.
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Process Clause, guarantees to all persons use of the judicial process to
redress alleged grievances.143 Paradoxically, while the United States
recognizes this right of access to the courts, it thwarts the attainment of that
right by knowingly excluding those who cannot afford to pay for civil
representation. Consequently, millions of Americans are barred from settling
civil disputes while others represent themselves in a system that is
effectively stacked against them.144
Where hiring private representation (choice one) is hindered primarily
by the systemic monopoly, it is important to acknowledge the role that both
the systemic and procedural legal monopolies play in the predicament of the
pro se litigant (choice two). Due to the systemic monopoly, UPL laws
prevent a litigant from hiring anyone who is not a licensed attomey.145 This
forces an individual that would otherwise wish to hire representation to
succumb to fee rates born upon them by the attorneys regulating the legal
profession.146 When a low-income individual is not capable of paying these
prices, their only option is to proceed pro se.
The procedural monopoly is now added to the quandary. When
representing themselves, many pro se litigants do not have the knowledge,
skill, or experience to adequately meet the procedural standards put in place
by the legal profession. 147 The procedures are put in place by lawyers so that
non-lawyers are unable to navigate through them. Even licensed lawyers fail
to complete the maze of rules and restraints designed by the courtroom.
External conditions have supplemented the monopolies' effects in
increasing pro se representation. 14 These conditions include high poverty
levels, increased literacy, individualism, the costs of litigation and attorneys'
fees, anti-lawyer sentiment, and the breakdown of family and religious
institutions that formerly resolved many disputes.149
With this increase in pro se litigants comes a range of problems that
disadvantage the individuals as a result of their unfamiliarity with the law
and court procedure.so To protect their rights, parties must be able to argue
the substantive law and know the rules of procedure in order to take their
143. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (holding that individuals have a right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29
(1963).
144. See Nichol, supra note 4, at 327-28.
145. See Denckla, supra note 61, at 2581.
146. See id.
147. See Adrian Zuckerman, No Justice Without Lawyers-The Myth of an Inquisitorial
Solution, 33 CIV. JUST. Q. 355, 355 (2014).
148. See Goldschmidt, supra note 141, at 36.
149. Id.
150. Zuckerman, supra note 147, at 355.
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dispute to court or defend against someone else who has. Those who lack
legal knowledge are in a disadvantaged situation to defend their rights.''
In a nationwide survey of approximately 1,200 state trial judges
addressing pro se litigants, 94% identified a failure to present necessary
evidence, 89% identified procedural errors, 85% identified ineffective
witness examination, 81% identified the failure to properly object to
evidence, and 77% identified ineffective arguments.152
Moreover, judges across the nation have reported that the resulting rise
in self-representation, especially with respect to proceedings involving
housing, domestic relations, and consumer issues, has led to negative
outcomes, not only for pro se litigants,153 but for the courts as well.154 This
included slower court procedures, inefficient court operations, overuse of
staff time, unfair presentation of relevant facts, and ethical dilemmas for
judges who may compromise their impartiality to avoid injustice.5 5
In addition to the inherent unfairness of procedural barriers, a vulnerable
situation is made worse when the unrepresented litigant faces an experienced
opponent who has access to legal resources, technology, and a financial
motivation to win. In our adversarial system, disputes are essentially a battle
between attorneys. It is no surprise that inexperienced pro se litigants do not
fare well. "Lest the citizenry lose faith in the substance of the system and the
procedures we use to administer it, we can ill afford to confront them with a
government dominated by forms and mysterious rituals and then tell them
they lose because they did not know how to play the game or should not
have taken us at our word." 5 6
B. Effects on Outcome for Pro Se Litigants
The negative impacts derived from the lack of a constitutionally
recognized civil right to counsel are evidenced by the direct detriments on
outcome success to litigants who proceed pro se.
After being denied counsel, the first burden that an impoverished pro se
litigant will face is the court costs to bring suit in a South Carolina court.
Effective May 1, 2013, the cost for filing a lawsuit is $350.00, plus a $50.00
administrative fee, for a total of $400.00 which must be paid when the
151. Id.
152. Painter, supra note 13, at 46.
153. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3, at 23.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 23-24.
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complaint is filed. 7 If the pro se litigant is unable to pay the filing costs,
they may file an "Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and
Affidavit."" This form is also referred to as an "Application to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis" or an "IFP application."5 9 If the IFP application is filed
with the complaint, the litigant will not be required to pay court costs at that
time.160 However, if the court denies the application, they will be required to
pay the full filing costs before being able to proceed with the lawsuit.
The second burden faced by a pro se litigant is the negative likelihood of
success. Extensive empirical evidence supports the reality that people who
are represented by attorneys are, on average, more likely to win in
162
adjudications than are people who proceed pro se. The extent of this
likelihood varies across different kinds of civil justice cases and different
studies of lawyers' impact. 16 One factor shaping the extent of negative
outcomes for pro se litigants, however, has been linked to procedural
complexity64 -the complexity of the documents and legal procedures
* * 165necessary to pursue a justice claim.
Some courts have tolerated certain informalities from civil pro se
litigants. 1 For instance, several courts of appeals recognize that a pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the consequences of failure to submit proper
materials in response to a motion for summary judgment. Other courts,
157. Information on Representing Yourself in a Civil Action, U.S. DIST. COURT DISTRICT





162. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 69.
163. See id. at 56.
164. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 52 (The results linking complexity as a factor were
achieved through studies of more than seventy thousand adjudicated civil cases that
contributed to the meta-analysis).
165. Id.
166. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se
Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1987), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2754&context=flr (citing Cel-A-Pak v. California Agric. Labor
Relations Bd., 680 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1982) (The court held that the Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3(c) "mandates liberality in determining compliance . . . 'courts of
appeals have discretion, when the interests of substantive justice require it, to disregard
irregularities in the form or procedure for filing a notice of appeal"')).
167. See id. (citing Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that "a court should be particularly careful to ensure proper notice to a pro se litigant")).
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however, expressly require pro se litigants to comply with all applicable
rules without any assistance from the judiciary.16s
The extreme burdens on pro se litigants to pursue their cases
independently and the unbalanced nature that prevents a true adversarial
process discourage litigants from pursuing legitimate claims in the first
place. In order to better balance the adversarial process, simplified
procedures for pro se litigants and the clear authority for discretion of
judicial leniency would allow ordinary people to pursue civil cases without
legal representation.
V. SOLUTIONS: INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND CLOSING THE
JUSTICE GAP
No single method is capable of filling the chasm that prevents access to
justice in America. Solutions that address the justice gap by expanding a
federally and state recognized right to civil representation do not lay counter
to those aimed at increasing the education, rights, and capacity of pro-se
individuals. Simultaneous attention is necessary in order to provide backup
support that addresses current gaps in the other. The solutions may be
different in form, but their substance and goals remain the same-to increase
access to justice in a way that commands "equal justice under law".
A. Abolishing the Legal Monopolies
In order to assist pro se litigants and balance the inequities resulting
from the lack of constitutional right to civil representation, the procedural
and systemic monopolies should be abolished using both in-court and out-
of-court reform.
To diminish the systemic monopolies effects on civil and pro se
litigants, in-court assistance techniques can be employed. One solution is to
implement new policies that include nonlegal routes as a solution for
* * * *169
common and significant civil justice problems. This requires loosening
168. See id. at 1111-12 (citing Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1365 n.7 (9th Cir.
1986) ("Besides favoring unrepresented litigants over badly represented ones, Jacobsen's
suggestion would require the trial court to help one side to a lawsuit rather than another solely
because of the status of their legal representation. Doing so necessarily implicates the court's
impartiality and discriminates against opposing parties who do have counsel.").
169. See Perluss, supra note 87, at 575-76 (For example, allowing non-lawyers to aid
indigent litigants in many ways, including "assistance in completion of mandatory court forms;
assistance in calculating proposed child support; selection, and distribution of court forms;
explanation of legal terms; information on basic court procedures and logistics such as
requirements for service and filing of pleadings, scheduling hearings, and complying with
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the UPL restrictions to provide greater access to the legal system by making
counsel easier to acquire.17 0 By permitting non-lawyers to provide legal
representation in court, an open market system will increase competition,
lessen the control that lawyers have in deciding attorney's fees, and create
more affordable legal services.'7' Consequently, the need for pro bono and
appointed attorneys will decrease and fewer litigants will feel forced to
represent hemselves.
In some U.S. forums, non-lawyer advocates are already authorized to
appear.172 Washington, for example, decided to take firm remedial measures
as a response to a Civil Legal Needs study that documented the high
prevalence among low-income households of civil disputes that are handled
without attorney assistance. 173 In 2012, Washington became the first state to
adopt a Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) rule that authorizes non-
attorneys who meet specified educational requirements to advise domestic
relations clients in the practice of law.174 The purpose of the innovative
LLLT rule is to increase access to legal services, particularly in areas with
high demand, and is a strategy uniquely employed to fill the justice gap.171
So far, Washington stands alone in formally licensing non-lawyers to
provide legal services.1ve California is actively considering non-lawyer
licensing, however, and several other states are exploring the possibility.17 7
New York has sidestepped licensing altogether by using "Courtroom
Navigators," and is already allowing non-lawyers to provide legal assistance
in limited circumstances like property disputes and consumer debt cases.7 1
local procedures; previewing documents to be presented to a judge prior to presentation;
attendance at hearings to assist the court with pro se matters; and assistance with preparation
of court orders under the court's direction").
170. See id. (citing Wash. Rev. Code 26.12.240 (2003) & Wash. St. Ct. G.R. 27,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/courtrules).
171. Zuckerman, supra note 147, at 356.
172. Robert Ambrogi, Washington State Moves Around UPL, Using Legal Technicians
to Help Close the Justice Gap, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/washington state moves_aroundupl usinglega
1_technicians to helpclose_the.
173. See Perluss, supra note 87, at 575.
174. In re THE ADOPTION OF NEW APR 28 - LIMITED PRACTICE RULE FOR LIMITED
LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIANS, ORDER No. 25700-A-1005 (Wash. 2012),
http://www.wsba.org/%7E/media/Files/WSBAwide%20Documents/LLLT/Supreme%20Court/
Legal%20Technician%2ORule.ashx.
175. Anna L. Endter, Washington Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLT) Research
Guide, U. WASH. SCH. L. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://1ib.law.washington.edu/con
tent/guides/llltguide.
176. Ambrogi, supra note 172.
177. Id
178. Id
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These Navigators may also accompany unrepresented litigants into the
courtroom, and while unable to act as advocates in court, they are permitted
to answer important questions from the judge.179
In addition to the benefits to be gained from in-court assistance
initiatives, utilizing out-of-court assistance reform can diminish the
procedural monopoly that incapacitates pro se litigants. so Public legal
education is one out-of-court example that will teach the public about their
rights and increase the capacity of pro-se litigants to competently litigate
their cases. Assisting pro se litigants in this way may mean creating and
distributing easy to comprehend explanations of the law and court procedure
through free legal advice, pamphlets, or internet websites.'' Attorneys could
assist members of the public in figuring out what their legal claims might be
or, indeed, whether they have any legal claims at all.182 Part of the impact of
an expanded access to counsel could be to better inform the public about the
practical scope of the legal system.8 3 Court staff must be allowed to assist
unrepresented litigants with process requirements, and lawyers must be open
to wider pro bono schemes.184
The decrease in monopolization will also supplement other solutions
that increase access to justice. In regards to expanding a civil right to
counsel and legal services, a gap will form between those individuals
deemed indigent (who will be afforded counsel because they make an
amount lower than the impoverished requirement) and those who are not
afforded appointment because they fall above that ceiling but do not make
enough to afford private representation independently. This category
primarily consists of middle-class Americans who face the same civil justice
problems and earn the same legal ultimatum in response, yet would be
afforded no remedy by statute.
While the justice gap requires a complete right to civil representation,
granting a solely rights-based solution' will leave only some of more than
179. Id.
180. Zuckerman, supra note 147, at 356 ("Such a reform would be similar to that which
took place in the 1980s, when the solicitor's monopoly over conveyancing was abolished,
which in turn resulted in a dramatic fall in the cost of conveyancing.").
18 1. Id.
182. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 77.
183. Id.
184. Zuckerman, supra note 147, at 356.
185. This assumes the right is given only to those who meet a certain standard according
to the Federal Poverty Guidelines (as is currently the case with criminal appointment of
counsel and the distribution of legal services aid by the LSC). This issue would not arise, for
example, if every litigant were offered state-provided legal counsel-a solution I do not
suggest would be the most appropriate to counter the justice gap efficiently.
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one hundred million people living with civil justice problems eligible for
publicly funded lawyer representation. Currently, a person is not eligible
for LSC-funded services if his or her family's income is more than 125
percent of the federal poverty guidelines,17 and for a family of four in 2015,
this threshold would mean an income that is less than about $30,313. With
a growing deficit in funding for public legal resources, the solution for those
deemed ineligible for legal services lies clearly with the demolition of the
legal monopolies. This is also where the powerful nature of creative
solutions will act to simplify and expand the traditional formal nature of
American legal services.
De-monopolization is important because it helps those who will be
unable to utilize a right to counsel for indigent litigants. Middle-class
Americans not eligible for appointment or legal services will instead benefit
from the flexibility and lowered costs of expanding legal practice to non-
lawyers. This means that absent quality concerns, individuals will be
provided representation on a basis that far outweighs the current alternative
of forced pro-se representation. Low and middle-class Americans will also
benefit from the simplification and leniency of the law for lawyers, non-
lawyer equivalents, and pro-se litigants that will result from broadening the
procedural monopoly. Substantive law will lose its "mystifying appearance,"
procedural law will be replaced with simpler standards and judicial leniency,
and both substantive and procedural law will be taught to the public through
legal engagement programs.
One argument against opening the legal market to non-lawyers and
expanding legal services regards the same reason used to justify the legal
monopoly's existence-client and consumer protection. It is asserted that
those without traditional legal qualifications are less capable of representing
litigants than those who have studied general laws for three years at
accredited institutions.189 In more complex proceedings, this argument holds
weight. Somewhere along the line, however, two irreconcilable
presumptions arose. First, the monopoly is justified, in large part, based on
the presumption that the public cannot make informed decisions about who
is qualified to provide legal advice and, therefore, the government and
186. Sandefur, supra note 15, at 57.




189. See Ambrogi, supra note 172.
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profession must make that determination.90 This fiduciary model argument
claims that lawyers have unique expertise and clients do not have the
capacity to assess alternative legal services to competently know what they
need; therefore, a fiduciary duty and extensive liability is needed to protect
consumers.191 However, those presumed incapable of assessing the quality
of legal services are then presumed capable of becoming educated enough
about the law to handle their legal matters pro se as an adequate alternative
to private representation.192 A viable solution to balance the interest of the
fiduciary and market model approaches is to allow non-lawyers to practice
law in areas of average complexity while requiring supervision, disclaimers,
and information to protect consumers in a market regulation scheme that
would allow consumers freedom and independence in selection.
Other benefits stemming from the control of monopolization and self-
regulation include the capability of bar associations and the states to enforce
individualized disciplinary rules. Lawyers are held to high educational
standards and are accompanied by high liability when it comes to conduct
and practice. One legitimate concern of expanding the legal profession
beyond the borders of the current monopoly is the inability to control or
discipline non-lawyers in conduct that would rise to the level of professional
discipline but not incur civil liability.1 93 Like the arguments stated above,
consumer protection solutions will contain fiduciary solutions. This includes
holding non-lawyers liable the same way an attorney would be and requiring
education requirements to assure adequate competency. For example,
Washington's LLLT's are required to have an associate's degree and 45
credits of core education.194 They may qualify for a waiver of the core
requirements if they pass a paralegal examination and complete 10 years of
experience working under a lawyer's supervision.195 Once licensed, LLLT's
are also subject to a regulatory framework similar to that of lawyers.196 They
must pay an annual license fee, fulfill annual education requirements, set up
IOLTA accounts for client funds, and maintain professional liability
190. RICHARD L. ABEL, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (Basil
Blackwell Ltd., 1988).
191. See id.
192. See Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession's Monopoly: Failing to Protect
Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2683 (2014).
193. See Ambrogi, supra note 172 (noting that one way to remedy the risk that LLLTs
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insurance of up to $100,000 per claim.197 By expanding the legal profession
while fulfilling consumer protective functions, valuable alternatives to legal
services are permitted to increase access to justice for those whose needs are
currently unmet.
To abolish the monopoly and its embodied problems of exclusivity,
regulations regarding the practice of law should balance the management of
consumer risks with the impact on innovation and access. Both implicate the
protection of consumers and the ability to access justice. Currently, the
balance has slanted too far in the direction of managing risks at the sake of
stifling innovation. It is time for the main regulators of the legal
profession the state supreme courts-to revisit the scope of the legal
profession's exclusive monopoly.
B. Acknowledging an Absolute Right to Civil Representation
The right to counsel in civil cases is a necessary step that must be taken
in addition to decreasing the monopolies over legal services and complexity
of law in order to close the justice gap. It is already provided in many
western countries including England, Canada and Australia.98 The
European Convention on Human Rights recognizes broad indigent access to
attorneys in civil cases.'99 In the United States, due to the consistent failure
to recognize a federal right to civil representation, state statutes regarding
indigent individuals differ in nature and interpretation, resulting in a lack of
consistency in and between states on the status of civil appointment.200 The
solution of a national civil Gideon rationale is far from novel and has been
supported through projects, coalitions, and national campaigns by individual
201attorneys and leading organizations for decades.
197. Id
198. Gary Toohey, A Civil Right to Counsel: Inevitable or Unrealistic?, 7 PRECEDENT
26 (Spring 2013), http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/
Precedent/2013/Spring/civil.pdf
199. See Tarik N. Jallad, A Civil Right to Counsel: Int'l and Nat'1 Trends 12-13 (UNC
Ctr. on Poverty, Work and Opportunity, Working Paper, 2009),
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/projects/accesstojusticejallad.pdf (citing Airey v.
Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 24 (ser. A) (1979) (holding that it would be "certain that an
applicant 'would be at a disadvantage' if their adversary was 'represented by a lawyer and
[they] were not"').
200. See id at 4 (noting states have diverged on deciding whether there is a right to
appointed counsel). Compare New York Housing Authority v. Johnson, 148 Misc.2d 385, 387
(N.Y.Sup. 1990) (holding that no right to appointed counsel existed for an indigent tenant)
with O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1998) (holding that Lassiter is not
controlling).
201. Schneider, supra note 74, at 6.
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Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law . . . . He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. If that be true of men of intelligence,
202how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate.
Indistinguishable from civil cases, Powell v. Alabama set forth this famed
reasoning in the criminal context to mandate a constitutional right to
counsel.203
Without a national right to civil counsel, South Carolina courts and
legislature are responsible for acknowledging that the rationale reflected in
Gideon, based on the threat against incarceration, is just as applicable in the
civil court context. The broad category of cases that are currently excluded
from court appointment by statute or common law may have as much of an
impact on a person's livelihood as Gideon 's risk of imprisonment or those
204civil categories already judicially or statutorily provided for. An
established right to counsel will fill the gaps currently left by case law and
appointment statutes.
The philosophy that prompted the Gideon rationale in the criminal
context is a foundation that supports the creation of a constitutional right to
counsel in civil cases. When looking past formalism and tradition in order to
achieve fairness, it is clear that the liberties at stake in the criminal context
are indistinguishable from those risks born by a civil litigant, especially
when related to the basic necessities of life. As portrayed in Gideon, those
risks warrant the constitutional protection of counsel at both the state and
national level.205 Because the Supreme Court has been hesitant to do so,
responsibility lies with the states to expand the right in order to improve
access to justice. This could be done by expanding the right to counsel
through statute and case law and increasing funding for civil legal services.
202. Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
203. Id.
204. See Bradish J. Waring, Wallace K. Lightsey, Burnet R. Maybank III, Rule 608 Civil
Court Appointments Does Unfunded Mean Unconstitutional?, S.C. LAW. 42 (2007) (Rule 608
of the S.C. Appellate Court Rules authorizes the circuit or family court to appoint an attorney
to serve as counsel or guardian ad litem for indigents within the state and outlines the
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C. Expanding Statutory and Case Law Appointment
As the civil Gideon movement continues to take hold in jurisdictions
throughout the country,206 it is essential that the South Carolina legislature
and judicial system expand appointment of civil counsel through statute and
case law. Specifically, South Carolina can commit to the interests in
adequate representation that it has already set forth in statutory and court
appointment cases by expanding the right to representation to all high-stakes
and complex civil cases.
The hesitancy of South Carolina to expand the category of cases that are
currently provided for by statute and case law can likely be attributed to the
lack of resources and while recognizing their authority to do so-the
unwillingness of courts to order undue burden upon disinclined attorneys to
represent without compensation. Although the holding of Dibble established
the discretionary power of South Carolina courts to appoint lawyers to serve
207without compensation, it warned they "would not require that lawyers be
appointed to serve in every case."208 If an attorney's undue burden prevails
209because of financial considerations, the funds for civil appointments may
be paid from the Civil Appointment Fund created by the legislature in
1999.210 Despite increasing court fines, fiscal cuts have caused resources
allocated to this fund to dwindle, provoking the 2003-2004 Accountability
Report from the Commission on Indigent Defense (CID), which operates the
fund.211 The report states, "[t]he main barrier to the successful operation of
this Agency is adequate appropriated funding.... [s]trong appropriated
funds are necessary."212 Furthermore the 2011 CID Annual Accountability
Report describes that it had no funds to pay Rule 608 Civil Appointment
213vouchers for all of FY 2010-11 and accumulated approximately $800,000
214
in unpaid vouchers.
Rather than considering the impacts on counsel or financial situation of
the litigant,215 courts should concentrate on the burdens of non-appointment
206. Schneider, supra note 74, at 6 (detailing how states such as Washington and
Maryland have organized regional or statewide projects and coalitions).
207. Exparte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983).
208. Id. at 596-97, 310 S.E.2d at 443.
209. Id. at 597, 310 S.E.2d at 443.
210. H. 3696, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 113th Sess. (S.C. 1999).
211. See S.C. COMM'N ON INDIGENT DEF., FY 2003-04 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5
(2004); Waring et al., supra note 204.
212. Id at 40, 42.
213. S.C. App. Ct. r. 608.
214. S.C. COMM'N ON INDIGENT DEF., FY2010-11 Accountability Report 5 (2011).
215. H. 3696, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 113th Sess. (S.C. 1999).
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to litigants. Left without counsel, litigants who are forced to proceed pro se
often are incapable of knowing their rights or defending legitimate claims
without lawyers. For example, current South Carolina statutes and prior
litigation often grant substantive rights in civil cases that mean little or
216nothing if they are not claimed, and the incapacities are exacerbated when
self-represented litigants are not sophisticated or face well-represented
opponents.217
D. Increasing Civil Legal Aid and Pro Se Resources
A national study showed that although 89 percent of Americans agreed
that legal help in civil matters should be provided for low-income people,
only a third thought that low-income people have a very difficult time
218getting that legal help.
Conversely, a lack of resources-including support, funding, and
attorneys willing to work for the cause-is a major factor why LSC-funded
programs in South Carolina cannot assist almost half of those seeking
help.219 Helaine Barnett, a former LSC President, maintains that "[c]losing
the justice gap will require a multifaceted approach that includes increased
funding by federal and state governments, private funders and concerned
private parties, and increased pro bono contributions by individual
lawyers."220
In a day spent at South Carolina Appleseed stuffing hundreds of
envelopes with thank-you letters and hopeful donation envelopes, it was
clear that legal aid services need far more than the humble and welcomed
charity of our community. With a strong increase in federal and state
funding to local legal aid services, as well as to the South Carolina Civil
Appointment Fund, willing and competent service providers can focus their
efforts on accessibility, outreach, and allocation of civil resources. By
providing the programs and lawyers needed to fuel the appointment process
with adequate resources, South Carolina would be delivering a necessary
solution to help seal the justice gap. While there is hope for increased federal
216. For example, unclaimed tax benefits, consumer credit rights, tenants' rights in
eviction cases, and federal benefit assistance claims.
217. See Expanding Gideon: The Right to Indigent Civil Representation, N.Y. ST.
SENATE (Dec. 15, 2009), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/articles/expanding-gideon-
right-indigent-civil-representation.
218. Schneider, supra note 74, at 23 (citing BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, A
NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR CIVIL LEGAL AID 3 (2000), http://legalaidresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/belden-russonello-developing-national-message-civil-legal-2000.pdf).
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funding and a renewed interest in civil legal aid at the federal level, the
majority of recent reductions have targeted state resources of civil legal aid
which, until 2009, had been expanding and overtook LSC as the largest
source of civil legal aid funding.22 This directly implicates the access to
justice problems that the funding works to correct because the lack of
support from the federal level to create an inviolable right to civil
representation indicates that responsibility for doing so has fallen solely to
the states. Consequently, funding is lacking where it is needed most.223
Although legislatures naturally hesitate to increase funding, resourcing
civil legal aid services is an investment that will result in increased
224economic efficiency for South Carolina and the Federal Government. The
negative likelihood of success in resolving civil disputes without counsel
means more people must lean on the government for support in acquiring
housing, food, and medical services. Appointment of counsel will level the
playing field and return that money to the government for other aid
services.225 Resourced pro se litigants will increase judicial efficiency
because they will be in a better position to defend themselves.
The clear detriments of self-representation experienced by unsuccessful
pro se litigants, the judicial system, and civil society as a whole require a
commitment to both short-term and long-term solutions. South Carolina
should continue to expand a common law and statutory right to counsel in
addition to funding attorney appointment and legal aid resources. By doing
so, South Carolina will address the unremitting legal needs of those
represented in the justice gap.
E. Specific Criticisms
One criticism of expanding civil representation by either a right to
counsel or alternative legal service options is that it will overburden our
court system with frivolous and costly claims. Litigation in the United States
221. Alan W. Houseman, Civil LegalAid in the United States: An Update for 2009, CTR.
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POL'Y 1 (July 2009), http://www.clasp.org/resources-and-
publications/files/CIVIL-LEGAL-AID-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-2.pdf
222. See id. ("State funding actually increased for civil legal aid in 2008. Today,
however, state budgets are facing far greater crises than the federal budget and have far fewer
options for financing because most cannot create significant deficits.").
223. See id. ("While state funding is lower than in the most recent past, state activity on
civil legal aid continues to increase.").
224. See generally Sandefur, supra note 15, at 51-52 (discussing the discrepancy in legal
outcomes among represented litigants and pro se litigants).
225. See id.
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has historically been criticized as having "no cost deterrents,226 a "right to
trial ... with sympathetic juries," and plaintiffs who stand to win a fortune
with no cost or risk to himself227 It is true that appropriate restraints are
necessary to protect the court system from being overburdened. However,
the right to counsel can be granted in a way that protects against frivolous,
costly, or otherwise illegitimate claims. The growing justice gap and
numerous litigants in need of counsel support the creation of an approach
that encompasses both a complexity scale that considers how liberty
implicating the civil situation is, in addition to a cost-based scale that
considers how capable an individual is of paying for private representation.
For instance, if one chooses to sue their neighbor for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for an untrue, frivolous, or malicious cause,
the case should not merit the use of State Appropriation funds. These
restraints, however, do not outweigh the significant burdens created by the
lack of counsel. Rather than defaulting the appointment of counsel in terms
of "no right to counsel unless statutorily provided for," exceptions should
instead be pointed toward the situations where no right should be
provided i.e. "a right to counsel for indigent individuals unless deemed
frivolous, overly malicious, or otherwise illegitimate." The "indigent"
language means the cost analysis will take place before the statute is
triggered, with the remaining statutory analysis taking place after one is
deemed indigent. Most importantly, the statute does not seek to bar any suit
from being filed, only from being appointed counsel with no cost to the
litigant in certain cases.
Additionally, the legitimacy of our legal system necessitates an
improvement in access to justice. The current American system is only
letting 20% of the American population settle their most crucial disputes in
221court. Consequently, the entire systemic value of a functioning legal
system is usurped when it is both recognized as not being available to all,
and when expansion is ignored with the justification that it must necessarily
be offered to only some. Rather than purporting to slim down the cases
handled or remain content with an inadequate amount of cases addressed, it
226. This regards the American Rule which dictates each party is responsible for paying
its own attorney's fees unless specifically granted by statute or contract. Contrast this with the
English rule under which the losing party pays the prevailing party's attorney's fees.
227. DETLEV F. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 22 (5th ed.
2014).
228. Nichol, supra note 4, at 327 ("Study after demoralizing study demonstrates, with
daunting and repetitive consistency, that over eighty percent of the legal need of the poor and
near poor-a cohort including at least ninety million Americans-is unmet.").
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is instead necessary to expand representation and the capacity of legal
services offered in order to adequately serve justice for all.
VI. CONCLUSION
The American pledge is far from being fulfilled. A substantial justice
gap exists between the legal needs of low-income people and the capacity of
the South Carolina justice system to meet those needs. Consequently,
observers have advocated perennially for greater access to justice involving
a right to counsel and decreased monopolization of services and legal
complexity. Whichever solutions are utilized, it is clear that the traditional
routes to justice have focused too narrowly on formalizing law and legal
services. Instead, it is time to use multi-faceted and creative approaches to
improve access to justice. Recognizing the crisis in the U.S. civil justice
system is no longer enough. The future of legal rights and services is calling,
and the time to answer is now.
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